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DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

VIII. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
A.

COLORADO NOW EMPHASIZES THE RELATIVE NATURE OF THE
CLAIMANT'S AND
PLOYER'S

EMPLOYER'S WORK RATHER THAN THE EM-

CONTROL

OF

THE

CLAIMANT

IN

DISTINGUISHING

BETWEEN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND EMPLOYEE.

In Brush Hay and Milling Company v. Small,1 an order by
the Industrial Commission denying workmen's compensation benefits on the ground that claimant was not an employee was set aside
by the trial court, which found that claimant was an employee. The
supreme court reversed, agreeing with the Commission that claimant was not an employee within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.'
Claimant was an electrician, and also operated a store and
performed services for the general public. On occasion claimant
sold equipment to defendant, always at cost plus 10%0, and performed services for defendant, when required, for $3 per hour, which
was remitted after the completion of each job. Claimant was employed by defendant only when defendant's employees were unable
to handle the particular electrical work involved, which was once
or twice a month, for jobs lasting from two or three hours to two
or three days. Defendant's business was hauling and grinding feed;
when injured, the claimant was helping defendant's employees
remove an electric pump which was sold to defendant by claimant.
The problem faced by the court was deciding whether claimant
was an employee or an independent contractor. In making the
distinction the court discussed two tests, the first one being the
"control test." The court's analysis of this approach was basically
the same as has previously been used in Colorado.3 The control
test, employed by most courts,' includes, among others, the following elements: the right to control the details of the work, method of
payment, who furnishes tools or equipment, and right of termination
1 388
2

P.2d 84 (Colo. 1963).

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1-1 to 81-17-7 (1963).

3 388 P.2d 84.

See Industrial Comm'n v. Hammond, 77 Colo. 414, 236 Pac. 1006
(1925). The quotation by the court in the Brush Hay case is, in part, as follows:
Each case must be decided on its own facts ....
Among the factors more or
less controlling are: Does the workman give all or only a part of his time to
the work? ... Has the laborer or employee control of the details? Which may
employ, control, and discharge assistants? Which furnishes the necessary tools
and equipment? May either terminate the employment without liability to
the others? . . . Of these the most important . . . is the right of either to
terminate the relation without liability. Where such right exists, the workman
is usually a servant. Where it does not exist, he is usually a contractor. 388
P.2d at 87.
4 Note, The Employment Relation in Workmen's Compensation and Employer's Liability
Legislation, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 161, 169 (1962).
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of the relation.5 If the employer furnishes tools, controls details,
pays wages at regular intervals, and may fire without liability for
breach of contract, the employer-employee relation is indicated.
Colorado cases have previously emphasized the right of termination
of the relation element, deeming it decisive,' and equating it to
control so as to establish a master-servant relationship.7 Prior to
Brush, the control test was the test used in Colorado to determine
whether there was an employee-employer relation for workmen's
compensation purposes.
The second test discussed in Brush,' and most heavily relied on
by the court in this case, is the "relative nature of the work" test.
Prof. Larson prefers this formula,' and it has recently been adopted
by several other courts.10
5 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 843, 53 (1952); 99 C.J.S. Workmen's

Compensation § 92 (1958) ; Note, supra note 4, at 169, n. 30, citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), AGENCY § 220. Some recent cases applying the control test are: Scott v.
Rhyan, 78 Ariz. 80, 275 P.2d 891 (1954) ; State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 124 Cal. App. 2d 1, 268 P.2d 40, 42 (1954) where the court said:
"the test of what constitutes independent service lies in the control exercise."; Graf
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 234 Minn. 485, 49 N.W.2d 797 (1951) where the
court said that:
in determining whether the relationship is one of employee or independent
contractor, the most important factor is the right of the employer to control
the means and manner of performance. Other factors to be considered are
mode of payment, furnishing of materials or tools, control of the premises...
and the right of the employer to discharge the employee. 49 N.W.2d 801.
Klein v. Sunrise Bldg. Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 805, 180 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1958), the
court deeming both the control test and the "so-called relative nature of the work
test" (180 N.Y.S.2d at 887) principal factors in making the distinction; and Seals
v. Zollo, 205 Tenn. 463, 327 S.W.2d 41 '(1959) where the right to control was
deemed the primary consideration in making the employee-indopendent contractor
distinction.
6 Industrial Comm'n v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 122 Colo. 721, 220 P.2d 721
(1950) ; Industrial Comm'n v. Moynihan, 94 Colo. 438, 32 P.2d 802 (1934), which
held that "Nothing in the terms of claimant's employment precluded either party
from terminating the relation without liability, and that is the controlling element."
(94 Colo. at 442) ; Industrial Comm'n v. Hammond, 77 Colo. 414, 236 Pac. 1006
(1925).
7 Industrial Comm'n v. Valley Chip & Supply Co., 133 Colo. 258, 293 P.2d 972
(1956) ; Industrial Comm'n v. Bonfils, 78 Colo. 306, 241 Pac. 735 (1928), which
said, "By virtue of its power to discharge, the company could, at any moment, direct
the minutest detail and method of the work." (241 Pac. at 736) ; .ARSON, op. Cit.
supra note 5, at § 44.35.
8
Brush Hay and Milling Co. v. Small, 154 Colo. - 388 P.2d 84, 87 (1963).
9 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 43.50.
10
Boyd v. Crosby Lumber and Mfg. Co., 166 So. 2d 106 (Miss. 1964), where the court
held that, "there are two tests to be considered in analyzing an employee-independent
contractor question: (1) the control test; and (2) the relative nature of the work
test." (166 So. 2d at 110). The court, in applying both tests, came to the conclusion
that the exercise of control by employer (in spite of contract to the contrary) and
the fact that claimant was an integral part of employer's business, thus having no
independent business of his own, meant that claimant was an employee within the
workmen's compensation laws of Mississippi; Paly v. Lane Brush Co., 6 App. Div.
2d 50, 174 N.S.S.2d 205 (1958), where both tests were used; Parkinson v. Industrial
Commission, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136 (1946) where the relative nature test was
not discussed as such, but emphasis was placed on diversity of employer's and claimant's business and the claimant's independence (172 P.2d at 141).
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The essence of this test, as proposed by Larson," is the relativity of the character of the claimant's work or business and the
character of the employer's business. Considerations used in applying this test are, on one hand, the skill required of the employee
and the separate nature of his work from the nature of the employer's, and on the other hand, factors relating to the character of the
employer's business are whether the employee's work is a regular
part of the employer's business, how continuous it is, and its
duration." The greater the requirement of skill and the more separate the occupations, the stronger is the indication of an independent
contractor relation; continuous, regular, and extended use of the
claimant's services indicates an employer-employee relationship for
workmen's compensation purposes.
The control test is similar to the test used in the common law
of torts for distinguishing between employee and independent contractor, where the relevance of the distinction is whether or not
the employer is vicariously liable for the torts of a servant. The
relative nature test, however, has been suggested by Larson for use
in connection with workmen's compensation, 4 the purpose of which
is to compensate the employee for injuries suffered by him, and to
pass the burden of such compensation to the consumer as a cost of
business.
The court, in applying the tests, relied most heavily upon the
relative nature test. The court said:
.. . we attach significance to the following:
1. The nature of the service rendered . . . and its lack of any close
relationship with the business of Brush Hay. 2. Small rendered
services to Brush Hay for only a comparatively small part of his
total work month. 3. Small was "called in" . . . to do a "given
task" and not for general employment . . . . 4. Because of his
superior knowledge... Small controlled the details of his services.
5. Small . . . performed . . . by the use of his own tools ....
6. Only when the particular task was completed would Small bill
Brush Hay with Brush Hay then remitting in full .... 16
The first three considerations employed by the court are part of the
relative nature test, the latter three are elements of the control
11 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 43.52.
121bid. Also see cases cited in 99 C.J.S. Vorkmen's Compensation § 94 (1958). These

cases are cited for use of the criteria proposed by Larson as elements of the relative
nature of the work test.
13 SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY § 84 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
AGENCY § 220
(1958) ; LARSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 43.42.
14 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 43.41.
15 1d. at §§ 43.42, 43.51.
'8 Brush Hay and Milling Co. v. Small, 388 P.2d 84, 87 to 88 (Colo. 1963).
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approach. Has the application of both tests achieved a result consistent with the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act?
The Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed."t
Liberal construction of the Act would include extending its coverage;
broadening the definition of employee would be an extension of
coverage. The supreme court's previous use of the control test,
particularly emphasizing the right to terminate, was a narrow application of the act in comparison with the broadened view adopted
in the principal case. The court, in using both tests, has achieved
a highly liberal interpretation of the act without overruling its previous decisions.
In applying both tests, the court has fallen in line with those
cases which have applied the relative nature test.' The use of this
test is consistent with the purpose of the workmen's compensation
laws, which is to provide remedies where otherwise none might
exist."9
B. A

CLAIMANT WHO

Is

KILLED OR INJURED WHILE WORKING

FOR HIS EMPLOYER FOR LESS THAN THE USUAL WAGE RATE

Is

ENTITLED

To

COMPENSATION BASED ON HIS USUAL WAGES.

In State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Coleman,'° an award
for death of an employee was allowed by the Industrial Commission, affirmed by the district court, and, on writ of error brought
by the Insurance Fund, was affirmed by the supreme court. The
pertinent facts as stipulated were that claimant's husband was an
employee at the date of his death, was employed as an electrician
at $3.88 per hour, and was killed in an accident "arising out of and
within the course of his employment."'" When the accident
occurred, deceased was on a weekend trip to pick up equipment
belonging to his employer. It was agreed that he was to receive
expenses but not wages for making the trip, in accordance with the
17Rogers, Inc. v. Fishman, 388 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1964); Idarado Min. Co. v. Barnes,
148 Colo. 166, 365 P.2d 36 (1961); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Howington,
133 Colo. 583, 298 P.2d 963 (1926).
8
1 See White Top and Safeway Cab. Co. v. Wright, 171 So. 2d 510 (Miss. 1965);
cases cited in note 10, supra; and Note, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 161, 174 (1962).
19The Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that "employee," when used
in social legislation such as the National Labor Relations Act and the Social Security
Act, should be defined in accordance with elimination of the form which the laws
were passed to avoid. The court felt that the common law definition of employee as
used in master-servant law was inadequate. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704
(1947); N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
20392 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1964).
21

Id. at 599.

212
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practice regarding similar trips made by deceased on behalf of his
employer.
The Fund contended that deceased was performing a contract
for hire separate from his normal employment; and that the contract failed to provide for wages, so that compensation should have
been computed on the basis of a $10.00 per week minimum. 2
In holding as justified the referee's conclusion that no separate contract existed,' the court analogized the facts of the case
to the situation where an employee is injured en route to work
or while on a coffee break. Injuries occurring at such times have
been held compensable as arising out of and within the course of
employment'

and therefore, the court reasoned, decedent's death

was compensable. Here, however, it was stipulated that decedent's
death arose out of the course of his employment; the real question
was which employment the decedent was engaged in at the time
of the accident. The only discussion given by the court concerning
the existence of another contract of employment was as follows:
... but having stipulated that there was one employer, that the
accident arose out of and during the course of the employment,
that deceased drew wages of $155.20 per week . . . it is somewhat
difficult to vizualize [sic] the deceased as employed on another
job with no wages.''25 The possibility of duality of employment
22

CoLo. REV.

2Id.

STAT.

§ 81-11-3 (1963).

at 600.

2 The injuries occurring in these circumstances, however, must still have been con-

2

nected with the claimant's duties as an employee, as when one uses his own car to
perform a specific mission for an employer. Electric Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 391 P.2d 677 (Colo. 1964) (A claimant who was "killing time" before
contacting his employer for work was not injured within his duties as employee.) ;
General Plant Protection Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 146 Colo. 191, 361 P.2d 138
(1961), which held that a director of advertising films, who was out of state on
location, and was killed while crossing the highway to his motel from a restaurant,
and who had declared he was going to work on the script at his motel was killed
as a result of hazards arising from and incident to his employment; Alexander Film
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 136 Colo. 486, 319 P.2d 1074 (1957). See also 0. P.
Skaggs Co. v. Nixon, 101 Colo. 203, 72 P.2d 1102 (1937) ; Wells v. Cutter, 90 Colo.
111, 6 P.2d 459 (1931).
Larson says: "while admittedly the employment in the course of the journey
between his home and the factory, it is generally taken for granted that workmen's
compensation was not intended to protect him against all perils of that journey."
LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 15.11. Injuries while journeying may be compensable if the journey is itself part of employee's work '(Id. at § 16). is made in
employer's vehicle (Id. at § 17), or the injury occurs while the employee is making
a trip for his own as well as employer's purpose, when someone else would have
had to perform the work if the employee had not (Id. at § 18.21). In this connection, Colorado has held that one who was allowed but not required to take work
home with him, and who had in fact taken work home with him, and was injured
going to work the next day, was not injured on a trip which was incident to his
employment, and therefore received no compensation. Industrial Comm'n v. Anderson,
69 Colo. 147, 169 Pac. 135 (1917).
State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Coleman, 392 P.2d at 600 (Colo. 1964).
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under a separate contract with the same employer was not discussed;
the essence of the opinion was a mere holding that the stipulation
that the injury arose out of the course of the employment was
justified.
The court, although failing to state adequate reasoning,
achieved the correct result in deciding that the accident causing
decedent's death arose out of and in the decedent's employment as an
electrician. When an employee suffers an accident while performing
a task not ordinarily within the course of his employment, but
which is done at the command of the employer, 6 or done by the
employee to enhance his value as such to his employer, 7 it is usually
held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the claimant's normal employment. In the Coleman case, deceased made the
trip at the instance of his employer, and it is probable that his reason
for making the trip without wages was connected with his employment as an electrician. The opinion in the principal case, however,
fails to apply any rules of law which determine whether or not a
separate contract of employment exists. The court did distinguish
the facts of the Coleman case from the situation where there are
two employers for whom separate kinds of work are being performed. 8 This is like distinguishing black from white, however,
Industrial Comm'n v. Stebbins, 102 Colo. 136, 78 P.2d 368 (1938), allowed recovery
when, at his boss's orders, a construction foreman was checking on the night watchman, and was killed in an automobile accident when he and wife were driving to the
town where the watchman resided. In Electric Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 391 P.2d 677, 679 (Colo. 1965), the court noted that, "It has been held
that where an employee uses his own car, as here, to perform services for or at the
direction of his employer he remains in the course of his employment until he returns
home." See also Bundy v. Petroleum Products Co., 103 Kan. 40, 172 Pac. 1020,
1021 (1918), where it was held that:
[A) workman who has been engaged for a specific employment at a fixed
amount may recover from his employer compensation, based upon the earnings
of persons in that grade of service, for an injury received while working for
less wages in a different grade to which he had been assigned.
Teldhut v. Latham, 60 N.M. 87, 287 P.2d 615 (1953); Howell v. Kingston Tp.
School Dist., 106 Pa. Super 89, 161 At. 559 (1932) ; and Krier v. Dick's Linoleum
Shop, 78 S.D. 116, 98 N.W.2d 486 (1959).
27 "Where, however, the nature of the employee's act was known to and acquiesced in
by the employer and tended to prepare the employee for advancement in line with
the employer's custom, it may be held to have arisen out of the employment." Annot.
123 A.L.R. 1176 (1939). The issue before the Colorado court was in the course of
what employment did the accident happen. The court held that in fact there was
only one employment. In the following cases it was held that the accident arose out
of or in the course of the original, basic employment, although it might not have
been contended that there were several contracts of employment: see Williams v.
Central Flying Service, Inc., 236 Ark. 709, 368 S.W.2d 87 (1963); Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 303 Il. 540, 135 N.E. 784
(1922) (where a trapper who wanted to be a driver was driving at the time of the
compensable accident in order to gain experience for his upcoming promotion to
driver, and such was customary) ; Morningstor v. Corning Bakery Co., 6 App. Div.2d
128, 176 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1958).
2s
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and is not helpful in establishing legal standards for deciding a
case with different facts.
C.

Loss OF BOTH CORRECTED AND UNCORRECTED VISION

Is Now

COMPENSABLE IN COLORADO.

In Rogers, Inc., v. Fishman,29 the supreme court on writ of
error affirmed a judgment of the district court which had approved
an award by the Industrial Commission allowing compensation for
loss of corrected vision. Claimant, before the injury, had almost
no vision in his left eye, until correction made it normal. Before
the accident, claimant's right eye was nearly blind, and the accident
caused the loss of all corrected vision in the left eye. After the loss
of vision of the right eye was sustained, normal vision was restored
in the right eye by corrective surgery.
The court held that an injury causing the loss of corrected vision
is compensable under the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act.
The contention of the Fund, that the employer should not be
charged with a corrected loss because the employer is required to
pay for uncorrected losses without receiving credit for correction,30
was rejected by the court by distinguishing the principal case as a
different kind of case from cases which established that rule." The
court then said that liberal interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act required the holding that loss of vision meant loss
of corrected as well as uncorrected vision.32
The decision and reasoning of the court is consistent with that
2State

Compensation Ins. Fund v. Coleman, 392 P.2d 598, 600 (Colo. 1964).

29 388 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1964).

However, this rule had been followed in Colorado in Great American Indem. Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 114 Colo. 91, 162 P.2d 413 (1945); and in Jewell Collieries
Corp. v. Kenda, 110 Colo. 394, 134 P.2d 206 (1943). The court cited these cases
and distinguished them. The reasons which have been advanced for the failure to
take correction into account are that the remedial purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act would be defeated by such a method of compensation, as restoration of
sight by means of glasses does not eliminate the handicap for which compensation
is supposed to be provided. (Great American Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
supra).
Other jurisdictions, however, are not in agreement on the question; those computing the correction contend that it is unrealistic to fail to take into account the
value of eyeglasses in removing the handicaps caused by reduction of vision. For a
discussion of those cases, see Annot. 142 A.L.R. 822 at 832 (1943), and annotations
thereby supplemented. Note, Workmen's Compensalion- Eye Injuries and Loss of
Vision, 35 N.C.L. REv. 443 (1957) contains a discussion of the rules in the various
jurisdictions.
31 388 P.2d 755, 756 (Colo. 1964).
32 Ibid. Many of the workmen's compensation cases in Colorado espouse and reaffirm
the rule that the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in awarding remedies thereunder. See cases cited in note 17, supra.
30
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in cases decided in other jurisdictions, 3 and does not conflict with
other Colorado cases dealing with loss of vision within workmen's
compensation law.34 The rule accepted in Colorado, that the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed, should readily
be applied to all cases involving loss of vision, since loss of vision
handicaps one's industrial usefulness more severely than almost any
other single injury. Liberal allowance of claims for loss of vision
33 "[Alccording to most authorities, the extent of impairment of vision will be deter-

mined in view of the use of glasses . . . the extent of loss of vision due to an injury
may be computed on the basis of the pre-injury vision as corrected by glasses."
58 AM.JUR. Workmen's Compensation § 290 (1948). An analysis of some of the
authorities so holding reveals the liberality which prevails in making awards for loss
of vision. In Illinois, the fact that there is no statutory provision regarding the basis
of computation of loss of vision, the fact that the purpose of workmen's compensation is to compensate for financial loss to the employee due to reduction of his
industrial value, and the fact that corrected vision has industrial value required a
holding that compensation should be based on loss of corrected vision. Lambers v.
Industrial Commission, 411 II1. 593, 104 N.E.2d 789 (1952). Since the purpose of
the Iowa Workmen's Compensation Act is to reimburse the employee for injuries
suffered, it is not fair to omit the pre-injury correction of vision in computing the
extent of the loss. Whitney v. Rural Independent School Dist. No. 4, 232 Iowa 61,
4 N.W.2d 394 (1942). In Nebraska, a victim is compensated to the full extent of
his industrial loss caused by an industrial accident. The court recognized that one
having partial vision may have high industrial value, but has none when blind, and
held that when one loses his sight, compensation is not based on normal vision.
Ames v. Sanitay Dist., 140 Neb. 879, 2 N.W.2d 530 (1942). Corrected vision is
as valuable as normal vision and its loss should be compensated in order to fulfill
the liberal ends of the North Carolina workmen's compensation laws, when there
has been total loss of vision. Schrum v. Catawba Upholstering Co., 214 N.C. 353,
199 S.E. 385 (1938). This case is discussed in Comment, Eye Injuries and Loss
of Vision, 35 N.C.L. REv. 443 (1957), which recommends that computation on the
basis of corrected vision not be limited to total blindness situations, but should be
based on corrected vision both before and after the accident. Id. at 448.
In Reigle v. Sholly, 140 Pa. Super. 153, 14 A.2d 166 (1940) the court allowed
compensation for loss of a blind eye that could have been restored to sight through
an operation. The Virginia court imputed to the drawers of the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act the common knowledge that corrected vision has industrial
value, and thereupon held that, since no provision was included in the act, corrected
rather than uncorrected vision should be used as the basis for compensation. Walsh
Const. Co. v. London, 195 Va. 810, 80 S.E.2d 524 (1954).
There is scant contrary authority, which is discussed in Comment, 35 N.C.L.
REv. 443, supra, and in Comment, 28 NOTRE DAME LAW. 152 (1952). It is interesting to note that Shrum v. Catawba Upholstering Co., supra, held that corrected
vision prior to accident was not used as a basis for computation of extent of loss
when complete blindness was not occasioned by the accident. However, cases which
have held that awards for loss of vision should be computed without consideration
of the effects of correction are cases in which vision was corrected after, but not
before, the accident. Allesandro Petrillo Co. v. Marioni, 33 Del. 99, 131 Atl. 164
(1925); Shaw v. Rosenthal, 112 Ind. App. 468, 42 N.E.2d 383 (1942); Parrott
Motor Co. v. Jolls, 168 Okla. 96, 31 P.2d 925 (1934); Pocahontas Fuel Co. v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 118 W.Va. 565, 191 S.E. 49 (1937).
34 Colorado has been liberal in awarding compensation for loss of vision. As stated in
note 33, supra, post-accident correction of vision is not used as a basis for making
the awards. In Downs v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Colo. 12, 121 P.2d 489 (1942)
which was cited by the court in the Fishman case (388 P.2d at 756), a claimant
suffered the enucleation of an eye the vision of which had previously been seriously
impaired, and was allowed the full amount for loss of an eye. When, after an accident, an injured employee may distinguish large objects and shadows, he is nevertheless entitled to compensation for total disability. Industrial Comm'n v. State Ins.
Compensation Fund, 71 Colo. 107, 203 Pac. 215 (1922). A holding contra to the
rule of the Fishman case would not be consistent with the humanitarian, protective,
and beneficient purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
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would also be justified on the ground that only 104 weeks' wages
are allowed for the blindness of an eye,3" an award which seems
quite meager in view of its value to its owner and the exclusiveness
of workmen's compensation as a remedy.
D.

THERE

Is No

RECOVERY

FOR INJURIES CAUSED

By

RECRE-

ATIONAL ACTIVITIES

UNLESS THE ACTIVnES ARE REQUIRED
BENEFIT THE EMPLOYER.

By OR
The Colorado Supreme Court, in Murphey v. Marquez,"
reversed the decision of the district court which had approved an
award made by the Industrial Commission. The claimant's husband
had been accidentally killed by a blast from a shotgun which he
was removing from the roof of a building upon which he had been
working as a roofer. The shotgun belonged to the foreman, who
had brought it for the employees' use in shooting pigeons on their
own time, and at the time of the accident decedent was removing
the gun on the foreman's orders. The gun was neither needed nor
used in connection with the roofing business.
The court reasoned that the injury was not within the course
of employment because injuries occurring during recreational activities are compensable only when: [Quoting from LARSON, op. cit.
supra note 5, at § 221
(a) They occur on the premises during a . .. recreation period
as a regular incident of the employment; or (b) The employer, by
. ..requiring participation, or by making the activity part of the
services of an employee, brings the activity within the orbit of the
employment; or (c) The employer derives substantial direct benefit . . . beyond the intangible value of improvement in employee
health and morale that is common to all kinds of recreation ....37
In denying recovery, the court said there were no facts forming a
basis for application of these tests, and that any findings of the
Commission which could have justified their application were not
supported by the evidence. 8
There is some Colorado authority concerning the compensability of injuries occasioned by recreational activities. A discussion
of cases concerning injuries while participating in athletic activities
is found in Lindsay v. Public Service Co. of Colo.39 (cited by the
court in the instant case), 4 which strictly applied the "benefit to
35

COLO. REV. STAT. § 81-12-4 (1) (hh)'(1963).
P.2d 553 (Colo. 1964).

36 393

37id. at
38

556.

ibid.

39 146 Colo. 579, 362 P.2d 497 (1961).

40 Murphey v. Marquez, 393 P.2d 553 (Colo. 1964).
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employer" test as stated by Larson and adopted by the court, requiring actual direct benefit to the employer from the recreation. Other
Colorado cases do not indicate a liberal allowance of compensation
for injuries occurring during recreation where firearms are involved.4
There is no single test which is uniformly applied by courts
in other jurisdictions in determining the compensability of injuries
received during recreation. Usually, however, the injury must have
happened as a result of an activity beneficial to the employer, or
must have occurred on the premises as a result of a normal practice
incident to the employment.42 The decision of the court in the principal case was in line with holdings of other jurisdictions and prior
Colorado decisions, if the assumption made by the court, that the
accident occurred during a strictly recreational activity, was correct.
Shooting pigeons while on the job certainly does not benefit the
employer, nor is it the type of recreation which regularly occurs as
an incident of the roofing business.
There are facts, however, which would have justified a holding
that the deceased was not engaged in a recreational activity at the
time of the accident, but that he was doing an act arising out of his
employment. The gun was being removed on the foreman's orders
and was an act necessary to ending the day's work; furthermore, the
accident happened while the deceased was on the premises where
he had been ordered to work by the employer. Other courts, in
liberally construing workmen's compensation laws, have considered
41In Security State Bank of Sterling v. Propst, 99 Colo. 67, 59 P.2d 798 (1936), an
employee, a cashier at defendant bank, who, with the knowledge of the bank, carried
a pistol, shot himself while depositing a letter on his way to work. At this time,
the employee was bringing some out-of-town deposits with him as was his usual
practice. The death of employee was held compensable on the grounds that he was
doing something incidental to his work, with the knowledge and the acquiescence
of the bank. However, where an employee killed himself with a rifle which he was
carrying in order to shoot animals for dog food, and the rifle wasn't used in connection with his duties as a deputy water commissioner, the court denied compensation
stating that the accident did not arise out of the course of his employment. State
Compensation Ins. Fund v. Russell, 105 Colo. 274, 96 P.2d 846 (1939). When a
policeman was shot at a non-obligatory "turkey shoot," which he had participated in
at the encouragement of his employer, the supreme court refused to allow a deviation from the Commission's finding that the injury did not arise out of the claimant's employment. Industrial Comm'n v. Day, 107 Colo. 332, 111 P.2d 1061 (1941).
It is apparent that a substantial benefit must be received by the employer, or that the
work of the claimant must directly involve the handling of firearms, before the court
will deem a gunshot accident as one arising in or out of the course of employment.
4 Comment, Workmen's Compensation: Recreation of Employees, 15 OKLA. L. REV.
102, 105 (1962) ; Annot. 115 A.L.R. 992 (1938). In the case of Colsow v. Steele,
73 Idaho 348, 252 P.2d 1049 (1953), an employee was injured by a shot from the
pistol of a fellow employee. The foreman knew it was customary for the employee
to use the pistol for target pactice and did not object. The court reasoned that the
injury arose out of a risk customarily encountered by the employee at the location
where his employer required him to be, and was therefore compensable under a
liberal construction of the workmen's compensation laws.
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such circumstances in awarding compensation for gunshot injuries."
The court in the Marquez case should perhaps have given some
consideration to the possibility that the deceased was doing an act
which was disconnected with prior recreational use of the gun, so
that a liberal interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act
could have resulted in the allowance of an award.
E.

DEATH FROM

A

CAUSE LISTED

As

AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

MAY BE COMPENSABLE UNDER THE COLORADO WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT.

The supreme court, in Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial
Commission," affirmed the district court's approval of an award
of workmen's compensation death benefits made by the Industrial
Commission. The decedent was suddenly killed by carbon monoxide
poisoning when he entered a confined area to perform a physical
task. Death by carbon monoxide poisoning is listed as an occupa45
tional disease under the Occupational Disease Disability Act
(ODDA) and recovery under this act is exclusive."
The court correctly rejected the contention of the employer
that the inclusion of carbon monoxide poisoning as a compensable
disease within the ODDA meant that a death by carbon monoxide
poisoning was compensable only under the ODDA, even when the
circumstances causing the death were such as to constitute an accident within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Instead, the court
4In

Joe Ready's Shell Station & Cafe v. Ready, 218 Miss. 80, 65 So. 2d 268 (1953),
the cout held that a gunshot injury arose out of claimant's employment when claimant, who did bookkeeping work at her home, was injured while removing a shotgun
from the couch on which she sat while doing her work. The presence of the gun
was deemed a risk to which claimant was exposed as a result of her employment,
reasoning that in removing the gun claimant did an act in furtherance of the work
which she had been hired to do. The court found claimant's home to be the "employment premises." Recovery was allowed a claimant who was shot by a shotgun that
was used in part for sport, and in part for protection. When shot, claimant was
performing his regular duties. The court said that claimant's possession of the gun
as a pastime was not material when he was shot while actually performing his regular
duties as an employee. Gallaher v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 77 S.W.2d 312
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934). Where a construction worker who was searching for a route
along which to construct a road through a timbered area was shot by a deer-hunter,
the court held the risk to be incident to his employment and allowed compensation.
Arnested v. McNicholas, 223 Mich. 488, 194 N.W. 514 (1923). In Boyce v.
Burleigh, 112 Neb. 509, 199 N.W. 785 (1924), claimant was shot accidentally by
a fellow employee who was handling his employer's shotgun against express instructions. The court awarded compensation because claimant was shot while performing
work while on the employer's premises.

4392

P.2d 174 (Colo. 1964).

4 COLO. RaV. STAT.

§ 81-18-9 (17)

(1963).

COLO. REv. STAT. § 81-18-8 (1963).

1965

ONE YEAR REVIEW

discussed the definitions of "occupational disease' "" and "accident""
as previously formulated by Colorado, and re-affirmed the view that
an occupational disease is one which is slowly contracted as an incident of the type of work done by decedent, and that an accident
is an occurrence happening at a definite time and place from a
definite cause.'9 In holding that the mere inclusion of the medical
cause of decedent's death as a compensable disease within the ODDA
did not preclude recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act
in a proper case, the supreme court adopted the general rule applied
by other jurisdictions. 0
Peter 1. Wiebe, Jr.

' Industrial Comm'n v. Ule, 97 Colo. 253, 48 P.2d 803 (1935); COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 81-18-10(1)(a) (1963).
Prouse v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Colo. 382, 194 Pac. 625 (1921) was the only case
cited by the court, but there are others: See e.g., Hallenbeck v. Butler, 101 Colo. 486,
74 P.2d 708 (1937) ; Peer v. Industrial Comm'n, 94 Colo. 227, 29 P.2d 636 (1934).
When an employee was killed because of a sudden and excessive inhalation of gases
(which gases were normally inhaled in moderate amounts), the court in United
States Title & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Colo. 241, 230 Pac. 624 (1924),
deemed the death of the employee compensable, saying the opposite conclusion would
obtain if the death were a result of the accumulated effects of the deceased's daily
breathing of the gases. When this case was decided, however, Colorado had no
ccupational disability disease act; the act was passed in 1945. Colo. Session Laws.
1945, Ch. 163, at 432.
69 Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 392 P.2d 174, 179 (Colo. 1964).
50 "[A] disease constitutes an accident within the meaning of the Act if it is traceable
to a definite time and place." Dunlap v. Industrial Comm'n, 90 Ariz. 3, 363 P.2d
600, 603 (1961) ; Sullivan's Case, 265 Mass. 497, 164 N.E. 457 (1929). In Industrial Comm'n v. Roth, 98 Ohio St. 34, 120 N.E. 172 (1918), the court deemed an
accidental inhalation of fumes an accident rather than an occupational disease. In
New York, a disease is a compensable accident within its workmen's compensation
laws when its inception is traceable to a single act, definite in time, and is catastrophic. Lerner v. Rump Bros., 241 N.Y. 153, 149 N.E. 334 (1925). In LARSON,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 37:30, it is said:
It is generally agreed . . . that any disease is compensable which follows as a
natural consequence of an injury which qualified independently as accidental.
. .T
Ihe second type of clear case is that in which the disease is the direct
result of some identifiable mishap. . . . In such cases . . . compensation is
almost invariably awarded without any serious hesitation because of the fact
that the injury takes the form of "disease."
For a general discussion of cases holding the inhalation of gases accidental injuries
rather than occupational diseases, see Annot. 90 ALR 619 (1934).
48

